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CHAPTER 7 
 
INDUSTRY ANALYSTS AND THE LABOUR OF 
COMPARISON 
 
Neil Pollock  
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter considers how incommensurable artefacts and actors are 
brought together, the relationships between them standardized, so that they 
can be compared in the same space. This issue – described here as the 
labour of comparison – is beginning to attract attention from scholars in 
Science and Technology Studies (STS), Economic Sociology, Organization 
Studies and beyond. Some have gone as far as to conceptualize the economy 
in a way that comparison is central to its organization (Callon et al., 2002). 
Within this view, what has been termed as an ‘economy of qualities’ (Callon 
et al., 2002), the experts that measure and classify the properties of 
technologies and products are key. Lacking the devices to establish 
equivalence how can different objects be brought together and compared? 
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Without the practices to produce differences how can similar commodities 
be sorted out? The labour of comparison is not without politics or 
complexities (Barry, 2006; Mol, 2002; Porter, 1995) particularly concerning 
the status and detachment of experts who perform this work, the devices 
used in their craft, the identification of the properties to be measured, and 
the calculations and actions that stem from these practices (Callon and 
Muniesa, 2005). The labour of comparison and its related politics and 
complexities, should be of wider interest to scholars interested in objects 
and the economy, technologies and standardization. This chapter 
investigates the expertise and tools of a body of professionals whose work is 
centrally concerned with comparison – this is those specialized forms of 
consultants known as ‘industry analysts’. I discuss one particular set of 
industry analysts (the Gartner Group) and their attempt to analyse and 
compare software vendors through the production of the ‘Magic Quadrant’. 
 
The Magic in the Magic Quadrant 
Gartner are primus inter pares amongst industry analysts and have 
been particularly successful in mobilizing belief and expectations 
amongst both supplier and user communities.1 In particular, they 
produce a decision-making tool known as the Magic Quadrant (MQ). 
This attempts to compare and rank software vendors according to a number 
of predefined measures. It comes in the form of a box with an X and Y-axis 
(labelled as ‘completeness of vision’ and ‘ability to execute’) dimensioning 
a two-by-two matrix, with four segments into which one can see placed the 
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names of several vendors. Vendors are not randomly placed; each of the 
segments are individually labelled (niche player, challenger, visionary and 
leader). The position of a vendor in a particular segment signifies something 
regarding its current and future performance as well as its behaviour within 
the particular markets it is targeting (Burton and Aston, 2004). Decision 
makers are said to draw on and be influenced by these tools when 
making procurement choices (it has been argued that the MQ is the 
most referenced research tools in the IT sector [Violino and Levin, 1997]). 
Some argue that a high ranking on a MQ guarantees a vendor more attention 
than its rivals (Hind, 2004), with others suggesting that it even has the 
power to ‘make or break’ a technology (Violino and Levin, 1997), the result 
being that software vendors are keen to influence the shaping of these 
objects.  
 
This device however turns out to be potentially difficult to study (and its 
influence therefore hard to assess). This is because it is a ‘dividing object’: 
as well as enjoying extensive diffusion the MQ has been denounced in the 
practitioner press as devoid of ‘intrinsic value’ and as a mere ‘marketing 
tool’ (Howard, 2004). It is said to be overly ‘subjective’ in the way it is 
compiled, and despite claims by Gartner that they are ‘objective’ with no 
particular ‘axe to grind’, the tool is widely seen to be ‘partial’ and embody 
‘bias’ (Cant, 2002). Intriguingly, these contrasting accounts are not always 
the opinions of different communities but of the same groups. The people 
who use them are also seemingly among their biggest critics. How are we to 
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make sense of this form of market analysis that is seen as problematic but 
still widely used?; which is controversial but also said to be highly effective 
in comparing the performance of vendors? 
 
There are three possible ways of analysing the tool, only one of which helps 
in our task. A first strategy, perhaps the one favoured by critical social 
scientists, would be to debunk the tool. It is after all a version of the classic 
two-by-two matrix much beloved by European and American Business 
Schools. In this respect it would be relatively easy to reveal its limitations 
and imperfections (not least that it ‘flattens the world’ through hiding its 
complexity). However, I do not take this particular line here. A second 
strategy might be to treat the tool as a ‘convention’. This would be to 
explain its success through the fact it enjoys widespread take-up and use. 
Indeed, social scientists have used these arguments to good effect in the 
domain of Science and Technology Policy, for instance, where Arie Rip 
(2006) has described the extension of similar kinds of objects in these terms. 
However, whilst agreeing that the MQ is a convention, I cannot accept the 
implication that all conventions are completely ‘arbitrary’ and without 
‘content’, which is the reading one finds in Rip’s article. An alternative 
strategy – the one pursued here – would be to open up this ‘black box’ to 
study the production of the tool to see how vendor comparisons emerge 
from this contested socio-technical arrangement. In doing this I set in train a 
specific line of inquiry. I show how the MQ is ‘performative’. That is, it 
does not merely describe a state of affairs that already exists in the 
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marketplace; but nor does it simply offer a new means of representing and 
positioning vendors; rather it is also interacting with and modifying its 
object of study. Indeed the principal contention pursued here is that the MQ 
has become ‘successful’ because it is (re)shaping the technological field.  
 
 
WHERE IS THE SOCIOLOGY OF MARKET ANALYSIS TOOLS?  
Whilst tools like the MQ have been a feature of business settings for several 
decades, they still attract relatively little attention from scholars interested in 
the social analysis of technology. There is still nowhere near an adequate 
sociological language to describe their success or failure. The few studies 
discussing them seemingly only do so to demonstrate their flaws (see 
Lissack and Richardson [2003] who go as far as to suggest that such tools 
are ‘unethical’). Whatever the reason for this, it is clear that there are too 
few fine grained accounts of the genesis and influence of market analysis 
tools. There are exceptions, of course, as exemplified by recent work in the 
domain of Business History (see particularly Ghemawhat [2002] and his 
lengthy discussion of the ‘Boston Matrix’) and Strategy (see Jarzabkowski 
and Wilson’s [2006] description of strategy tools in action). My own field of 
STS appears, at first glance, well equipped to understand their nature and 
influence, given its longstanding interest in the models produced by 
scientists and engineers (see Morgan and Morrison, 1999). Yet the small 
amount of research conducted so far on industry analysts does not 
adequately reflect their complexity, but overwhelmingly tends to focus on 
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the intrinsically flawed, simplistic assumptions embedded in their 
assessments, and the often contested nature of analysts’ research (see 
Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, 2002). As a result, the work of such 
organizations is not adequately explained.  
 
 
The Performativity of Market Analysis 
These portrayals of intermediary groups like industry analysts and IT 
research firms current within much of the social sciences are unsatisfactory, 
particularly when it seems that industry analysts produce their assessments 
through systematic, albeit complicated, forms of research and that their tools 
do exert powerful albeit complex forms of influence. The approach in this 
chapter is influenced by scholars sensitive to the role that theories play in 
constituting economic markets. Recent work from Economic Sociology 
(Callon, 2007) and the Sociology of Finance (MacKenzie, 2003), for 
instance, argues that economic theories and financial tools are 
‘performative’; that is, they not only describe but can help produce the 
settings in which they are applied. Through their application, theories and 
their related tools change how people think about markets and go on to 
enact the ‘framing’ processes that serve to allow their operation. This is an 
important insight, which, if it can be used to illuminate the study of 
economic and financial transactions in general, can also aid our 
understanding of the workings of industry analysts and their role in the 
labour of comparison. 
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The actual notion of ‘performativity’ stems from the work of the linguistic 
philosopher J.L. Austin (1962) who wrote that a statement was performative 
when it did more than just describe a reality but was actively engaged in the 
constitution of that reality (c.f., Barnes, 1983). This begs the question as to 
whether any kind of assessment is possible. Could industry analysts make 
whatever judgement they choose? In Austin’s original discussion, he was 
careful to avoid discussing the ‘veracity’ of performatives. What was 
important was not whether statements were true or false but how, in actually 
making them, the speaker was ‘setting something in motion’ (Callon, 2007, 
p. 320). Callon has built on this argument in two ways: through replacing 
the concept of truth and falsity with ‘success’ and ‘failure’; and setting out a 
partial framework to study whether performatives have ‘successfully’ 
brought about that which they previously set in motion.  
 
This first point is relatively straightforward, especially for those familiar 
with the pragmatism of Actor Network Theory, but the second less so. What 
Callon intends is that performatives do not exist in isolation; they have 
meaning and effect in the ‘world’ they create for themselves. Callon 
describes theories and their world as a socio-technical agencement.2 In what 
follows, I analyse the MQ as a socio-technical agencement to show how it 
implies and gradually enacts a new world. This includes how Gartner set out 
an alternative way to describe of vendors as well as a research process they 
construct to enable their comparison and ranking. Using Callon’s argument, 
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it can be said that the MQ is successful (i.e., performative) when it is able to 
bring about the world that it points to (i.e., actors come to think of others 
and themselves according to its terms). I conclude by showing how the MQ 
becomes part of the ‘equipment’ (MacKenzie, 2009) allowing people to act 
in the IT market. 
 
A NEW COMPARATIVE MACHINERY? 
Study of the MQ was approached in the first instance using conventional 
forms of analysis. The tool was thus conceived initially as a ‘convention’ 
that was mostly ‘arbitrary’, that was successful through its widespread 
diffusion and take-up, all of which was bolstered by Gartner’s standing in 
the IT marketplace. Thus, the author of the chapter was genuinely surprised 
to find himself sitting listening to a talk that pointed to a rather different 
story. To give some indication of this I present extracts from a presentation 
given by one Gartner analyst to a large audience of IT practitioners. In the 
presentation he is talking about the history of decision making within 
information systems procurement. He begins by discussing how previously 
technology adopters had assessed systems prior to purchase:  
…we put together [in the 1990s] an outline of how you should 
evaluate administrative applications... [A]nd what we said was that in 
a stable environment you would look at ‘functionality’… That was 
pretty much what we were looking at. Why? Well a mainframe is a 
mainframe so technology wasn’t that different from one to another, it 
was basically a vendor’s box that you were buying but it was built 
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around a common architecture. When you looked in terms of cost, that 
was the driving factor for us; And service and support’. We really 
didn’t think much about vision of the company or their ability to 
execute we just bought what they had to offer… So, we had some need 
but it was kind of focusing on functionality and cost. What we said in 
‘97 was change. You need to look at functionality but most vendor 
packages are mature enough to where there is at least common 
functionality, so it is a matter of goodness of fit that you are looking 
at… (emphasis added). 
 
Here the traditional means by which people assess information systems is 
problematized. His critique focuses on the assessment criteria people 
currently use (‘functionality’, ‘cost’, ‘service’, etc.) which he suggests are 
no longer effective in sorting vendors out. How can you select between 
vendors using criteria of ‘technology’ when systems are no longer 
significantly ‘different from one another’? How effective is ‘functionality’ 
when vendors increasingly offer ‘common functionality’? He goes on to 
suggest: 
And we started seeing that trend in the early 80s…that said we had 
ageing of systems, people were using these systems…whether they 
were proprietary or home-grown for 15, 20, 25 years… And, the point 
is that you had to look at buying software as being a partnership with a 
vendor, and that’s a long-term relationship. It’s not something short 
term.  
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The analyst also thinks it has now become necessary to replace current 
assessment measures, as adopters tend to use the same solution for longer 
and as a result have ‘partnerships’ with suppliers. The implications of this 
being that organizational consumers need to assess not only systems but also 
increasingly vendors themselves.  
And so, the vision of the company – do they understand the business 
of [specific sector]? Do they know where you were going? – and the 
ability to execute, those are still crucial. We still say it is about half 
of what your criteria should be. Now, if I am a…Chief Financial 
Officer…I am probably going to look at functionality as being 
crucial. That’s fine. But somebody better look out for the good of the 
[institution] as a whole. Because your institutional perspective is the 
one that we’re responsible to look out for in IT (emphasis added).  
 
The analyst is suggesting a shift in decision making from the evaluation of 
functional and local concerns to more ‘strategic’ ones. In order to do this, he 
mentions how a consumer might apply Gartner’s own evaluation criteria 
from the MQ, which they term as ‘ability to execute’ and ‘completeness of 
vision’, when evaluating vendors. In other words, Gartner are proposing to 
re-frame decision making through bringing into being new kinds of actors. 
In so doing, the tool prioritizes comparative forms of assessment over local 
accuracy. That is, they give form to ‘ordinal’ characteristics as opposed to 
those that establish commensurability with local sites.3 The new frame 
renders vendors commensurable with each other (Burton and Aston, 2004). 
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Thus, it could be said that MQs generate comparisons not existing 
elsewhere. Through bringing vendors together in the same space, and 
through producing and standardizing relationships between them (Callon 
and Muniesa, 2005), the MQ might therefore be described as a technology 
of comparison as opposed to one of accuracy. 
 
In summary, I argue that the MQ is transformative and that in producing the 
tool Gartner are also re-constituting the technical field from one where 
people were concerned with local and functional issues to more 
comparatives ones. However, the world that Gartner are attempting to set 
out also requires a research process – a method by which information about 
vendors can be collected. This turns out to be one of the most controversial 
aspects of the tool and it to this that the chapter now turns.  
 
CONSTRUCTING A RESEARCH PROCESS 
Gartner do not entirely calculate MQs within the boundaries of their own 
organization. They are partially the product of interactions analysts have 
with the vendors themselves and a geographically dispersed network of 
vendor customers. Whilst conducting fieldwork a number of vendors were 
interviewed that had been subject to Gartner’s assessment, and I also talked 
to vendor customers as well as observing Gartner’s interactions with these 
people. 
 
Vendors Are On the Move 
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Several vendors were interviewed about their relationship with Gartner. 
SoleSys (a pseudonym) is a US based software package vendor who had 
been consistently well placed on the MQ. This year they were again 
identified as a ‘Leader’, and they made every effort to publicise this. After 
contacting the Marketing Director of SoleSys to arrange an interview, 
initially about a different issue, for instance, he sent me a recently published 
MQ to show how they had maintained their position. When I met with him, 
I took the opportunity to ask him about their continuously positive ranking. I 
broached the subject rather simply enquiring whether they ‘marketed 
themselves to Gartner’. He responded: 
It takes a lot of work, actually [laughing]. And, you don’t really 
market yourself to Gartner as they are very focused on the 
communications they have with corporations. So what they do, if you 
want to be considered for coverage on the Magic Quadrant, they send 
out a questionnaire in advance of the Quadrant. And it ends up being 
like a 50 page response that is required from a vendor, from, you 
know, the high level product strategy down to the feature and 
functionality and architecture. So we make an investment to respond 
to that as thoroughly as possible. And, that’s how, where our 
placement in the Quadrant comes from (author interview with 
Marketing Director, SoleSys).  
Whilst polite enough to laugh at the question he did, however, chastise me 
for the suggestion that they ‘marketed themselves’ to Gartner. This 
exchange was instructive. My reading of this was that to be well positioned 
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was far from a simple marketing exercise. The respondent from SoleSys 
was replying to a tacit derogatory definition of marketing as ‘selling’ 
something irrespective of its quality. Instead, he made the point that 
responding to Gartner required much internal ‘investment’ and ‘work’. He 
went on to insist that there needed to be substance behind the claim (even 
though his description did look like straightforward self-promotion and 
positioning). I thus imagine a dual process whereby a vendor has to first 
disentangle itself from the existing (functional) ways it currently conceives 
of itself and then to reframe these according to more strategic measures. 
This suggests that the subjects of Gartner’s research were ‘on the move’ so 
to speak; the vendors were remaking themselves in terms of the new world 
Gartner was attempting to set out.4  
 
Community Knowledge 
The second group from which MQs are derived are vendor customers. 
Gartner’s relationship with this group is particularly interesting. I observed 
how one particular analyst had built up and was managing a large network 
of people with whom he interacted on a regular basis. These people would 
continuously feed back ‘judgements’ to him on the particular vendors they 
were working with. Based on fieldwork I observed how a vendor ranking is 
enacted within these interactions – which constitute what might be thought 
of as a ‘calculative network’ (Callon and Muniesa, 2005). This calculative 
network and how it works is described more fully below, but for now I 
simply sketch some of its features. It is ‘selective’ in that analysts keep 
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themselves close to certain people and exclude others. It is ‘tactical’ in that 
people recognize the importance of these interactions and may use them to 
further goals. Moreover, finally, interactions in the network are often highly 
‘informal’ – being typically based on telephone calls or quick chats 
conferences, etc. These users who continuously feedback information to the 
analysts might be called ‘satellites’ and Gartner who, in turn, translate these 
judgements into positions on the MQ, as a ‘centre of calculation’ (Latour, 
1987). Further, the information within these networks might be 
characterized as ‘community knowledge’ to emphasize both its informal and 
distributed status. When pressed, for instance, Gartner will often deny that it 
is in fact them acting but that they are merely representing, within the tool, 
knowledge originated by others elsewhere.  
 
THE OBJECTIFICATION OF COMMUNITY KNOWLEDGE 
What I am arguing is that Gartner is shaping the world so that ‘community 
knowledge’ is no longer a highly particular and local form of knowledge but 
one that can travel the world. This is to say that this informal knowledge can 
be commodified. However, these kind of ‘judgements are not easily 
objectified (as Porter [1995] argues, judgements do not fit straightforwardly 
into quantification). For instance, during fieldwork it was noted how 
Gartner often struggled to account for the provenance of community 
knowledge and how there was a certain amount of ambiguity surrounding 
the methodological status of the tool. For instance, in its early life I found 
the more ‘quantitative’ aspects of the MQ were highlighted; and only some 
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years later was it described as resulting from ‘qualitative research’. Today it 
is typically described as having a mix of both these aspects:  
Gartner analysts use a combination of objective and subjective criteria 
to evaluate individual vendors… (Soejarto and Karamouzis, 2005, p. 
5). 
When Gartner say the tool includes ‘subjective criteria’, I take it to mean it 
is shaped through analyst interactions with clients. Indeed one might think 
that incorporating this kind of knowledge increases the tool’s credibility, for 
instance giving weight to the argument that Gartner are ‘close to the action’ 
so to speak. It is this community knowledge that Gartner are attempting to 
objectify, to bring into the calculation these customer judgements (seen as 
important but having until now remained outside the frame). Yet, this is also 
seen as one of the weaknesses of the tool (leading to accusations of 
‘partiality’ and ‘bias’).  
 
Partiality and Bias 
One issue appears to be the obfuscation that exists around these calculative 
networks and community knowledge. The fact that Gartner refuse to make 
the names of their sources public, for instance, is a cause of much concern. 
There is also little information on how specific customers are chosen as well 
as with the weight given to their views. During fieldwork, for instance, I 
spoke to one IT manager who was critical of how, despite the claim that 
Gartner advertise and consult widely when conducting their research, they 
had never solicited his views. He described how he thought the particular 
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Gartner analyst responsible for his sector had not been completely even 
handed when assessing SoftCo’s solutions: 
…he has been very negative to [Campus, the SoftCo module discussed 
earlier]. He has never called. He has never visited our site. [SoftCo] 
wants me to be on a conference call with him, but I really don’t want 
that. He just knows everything; he never listens… There are just some 
people you know that, I took an immediate dislike to him and that is 
because of that arrogance. But he does know a lot and Gartner is 
important… He is not against [SoftCo] he just thinks that they are a bit 
player and they are not serious. That is what I gather (author 
interview). 
Despite the fact he is well informed about SoftCo, and that he is someone 
who might have been expected to be contacted, this IT manager is not part 
of Gartner’s calculative network. It seems that in the labour of comparison 
Gartner actively differentiate between customers when gathering 
information: that access to calculative networks is ‘unevenly distributed’ 
(Callon and Muniesa, 2005).  
 
EXTENDING THE WORLD OF THE MAGIC QUADRANT INTO 
THE MARKET 
The chapter has thus far focused on the process by which Gartner gathers 
information for its MQs. In this section, I consider how the tool is extending 
into the market and with how it begins to ‘interact’ with the very things it is 
attempting to describe. I do so through discussing how Gartner’s 
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assessments were taken-up by one particular vendor customer and then with 
how they become part of the ‘equipment’ that condition his activities (such 
that he becomes involved in a complex set of strategic manoeuvres).5  
 
The Magic Quadrant at UserOrg 
‘Sergio’ is an IT Manager at a user organization (described as ‘UserOrg’). 
Sent the latest version of the MQ by an executive from a large software 
vendor (described as ‘SoftCo’) keen to report some good news that their 
rating was finally improving, Sergio, in turn, circulated it among his 
colleagues, careful to add his own interpretation of what he thought the MQ 
was saying:  
See attached an e-mail from [SoftCo] with some positive news that 
Gartner have improved their rating of [SoftCo’s] products within the 
[specific] sector. The diagrams are worth looking at because they 
show that [SoftCo] have improved since 2004 but also that they have a 
long way to go before they overtake their competitors (email from 
Sergio to colleagues). 
Although the vendor was keen to highlight a change in position, Sergio 
qualified the improvement through highlighting the ordinal nature of the 
tool and the fact that even though SoftCo had moved position, so too had all 
the others, and thus SoftCo still lagged behind its rivals. In a further series 
of emails, Sergio discussed with a Senior Executive at the vendor what he 
thought were the specific problems that Gartner found with SoftCo. He 
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received a reply to his email in which the vendor appeared to accept the 
assessment: 
Yes, we need to move ‘North’ in the execution axis and ‘East’ in the 
vision section. We really need to push across the line into the 
‘Leadership’ Quadrant. Implementation (speed, cost - same thing, to 
some extent) remains a challenge (email from SoftCo to Sergio). 
Here, the properties of this vendor appeared to be settled and adjusted to 
those of the MQ. The various actors present seemed to accept the alternative 
comparative machinery set out and agree that Gartner had ‘correctly’ 
identified that SoftCo had a poor ‘ability to execute’. However, this was not 
the end of the matter. What then developed was a fascinating and quite 
unexpected series of events. Rather than simply accepting the assessment, 
Sergio discussed with the vendor how he might be able to improve SoftCo’s 
position: 
…I think that the [CRM] final result will help move things much 
further. If we can then exploit BW [Business Warehouse] to include 
financial and other information then we should help to move the 
[SoftCo] position further in the right direction. I think that it is 
important for Gartner to realize that [SoftCo] are building up 
momentum as they move across the MQ (email from Sergio to 
SoftCo). 
The ‘CRM’ project was a customer relationship management system being 
built by SoftCo and implemented within Sergio’s organization. It was seen 
as a significant flagship venture since it brought together and integrated 
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several previously unrelated enterprise resource planning (ERP) modules. 
What Sergio was suggesting was that, once the CRM project was 
successfully implemented, news of this could be fed back to Gartner to 
provide evidence to improve SoftCo’s standing.  
 
UserOrg Becomes a ‘Test Case’ 
At this stage of the fieldwork I was intrigued with how this might happen; 
how could the CRM project be linked to the MQ in this way? I watched 
with interest as the IT manager attempted to court Gartner’s attention. 
Having recently become a Gartner client, Sergio had access to their analysts 
and his main point of contact was someone whom we describe as ‘Bob’. I 
observed as Sergio deepened this relationship with Bob: they began to 
conduct regular telephone conversations; to participate in lengthy email 
exchanges (which I had access to); and Sergio would engineer meetings 
with Bob in various places around the world (some of which I was able to 
observe). Sergio discussed this blossoming relationship with one of his 
colleagues:  
He [Bob] is coming to [UserOrg] in early November to a…conference. 
I tend to speak to him approximately every two weeks. He is really 
interested in seeing what we have done in UserOrg. He is also 
watching [KentOrg] and [PurseOrg] at the moment. I think that he will 
also watch [WestOrg] in the UK as well to see whether [SoftCo] can 
hit implementation dates. I am sure that we can generate some really 
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good publicity from our CRM project (email from Sergio to 
colleague). 
According to the email, Gartner were watching a number of sites around the 
world from which it would gather evidence about SoftCo’s ability to 
execute. Moreover, UserOrg had become part of this calculative network. 
This raised a number of issues, not least, as to why Sergio might go to such 
effort to improve SoftCo’s rating.  
 
Calculating Actors 
During the same period, Sergio was also in regular contact with a number of 
SoftCo executives, continuously reminding them of the influence Gartner 
was developing among decision makers. Sergio outlines the specific interest 
Gartner had taken in his project, as well as the work he was doing to 
encourage this attention: 
Gartner ([Bob] especially) are following every twist with great 
interest. He wants to spend much time with me in [the US] before and 
during [a forth-coming conference] (he’s invited me on to a User 
Panel on the Sunday [sector specific] Symposium to discuss the 
question ‘What message would I like to give to my ERP vendor?’!!). 
He also intends to visit [UserOrg] during his trip to [UK conference] 
(being held in the [UserOrg] area at the beginning of November). I am 
giving him very positive messages – he is very interested in the 
timescales of the project – possibly, because he is looking for evidence 
that [SoftCo] can implement good/solid implementations in a short 
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time-scale. He is looking for similar evidence from [KentOrg] and 
some other critical US implementations (email from Sergio to SoftCo). 
Sergio outlined to the vendor how their position on the MQ was now 
becoming directly linked to their performance at UserOrg. What Sergio 
hoped to achieve was to exert pressure on SoftCo to continue to devote 
further resources to his CRM project (the development had started well but 
had been floundering in recent months). In turn, SoftCo needed to improve 
(not worsen) their ranking. Sergio thus anticipated that Gartner’s interest 
would have a positive effect on the vendor. In another email to a colleague, 
Sergio described the success this strategy appeared to be having: 
Things are getting ever more interesting for me and the [SoftCo] 
relationship. They are really moving in to a ‘partnership’ role – 
throwing in highly competent resources to ensure that we go live on 
10th October. Though I guess it helps that they realize that [a senior 
Gartner analyst] has told them that Gartner are watching [SoftCo’s] 
ability to implement at each of three [organizations] in the world 
([UserOrg], [KentOrg] and [PurseOrg]) and that their results will 
materially affect whether [SoftCo] move from the lower left quadrant 
to the top-right! (email from Sergio to colleague). 
To summarize this section, the MQ had two principal effects. Firstly, it 
framed the setting so that the means by which vendor rankings can be 
improved has been defined. No longer an abstract or difficult to measure 
notion, vendor performance was translated into the most tangible of things: 
to repeat Sergio’s words, the implementation of its systems in the three 
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organizations ‘will materially affect whether SoftCo move from the lower 
left quadrant to the top-right’. Secondly, the fact it tied in vendor rankings 
with the success of these projects opened up the possibility of new kinds of 
action. In particular, the MQ equipped actors to calculate and act in 
different ways (Miller, 2001).  
 
 
HOW GARTNER DEFENDS ITS ASSESSMENTS 
I have argued that, in compiling these tools, Gartner hand the discretion 
over to others (i.e., this ability to comment on the capacities of vendors): 
they were keen to publically emphasize it was not Gartner but the wider 
‘user community’ that was providing judgements. In effect, these others had 
the power to say whether a vendor could execute or had vision. I describe 
this process through analysing how one satellite reported back to Gartner 
(and in so doing how he forced Gartner to defend its position). The 
particular episode took place in the US where Gartner was organizing a 
Symposium to coincide with a major IT conference. The IT manager from 
UserOrg, Sergio, travels to the conference, one of his aims being to update 
Gartner on progress of his CRM project. At the conference, the author of the 
chapter was sitting conducting an informal interview with Sergio when Bob 
from Gartner approached. Sergio straightaway began to force Bob to explain 
and defend his assessment of SoftCo, which he appeared able to do – in a 
robust manner. This confrontation continued and eventually Bob has to be 
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less guarded telling Sergio what he thought were the real problems with 
SoftCo:  
I told them [SoftCo] seven or eight years ago that they needed to start 
investing in the [specific] sector. We have a saying: ‘do something or 
get off the pot’. Have you ever heard that? (Sergio: yeah). In essence 
what I told them, it’s like ‘You put your toe in [specific sector] but 
you really haven’t committed’. They said ‘We just hired! We got 10 
people writing the [sector] system’ [Sergio: Gosh]. I said ‘Are you 
kidding me?’ I said ‘how can you? I mean, that’s embarrassing!’ I said 
‘The smallest software companies in the US…would have 50 or 60’. I 
mean, [DataSys] have got 50, 60 people. [GenteSys] have 100, 150. 
[BigVendor] have 150. You know 10 people is just nothing! They are 
up to, I don’t know, 20, 25 now but still it is not what I would call for 
the size of the company, I mean they have the resources to be a global 
leader in [specific sector] if they want to be. It is just that they have 
just never made the commitment. And that is what you are saying? 
In this situation there are two actors opposing each other through offering 
contrasting accounts of the qualities of a vendor. Sergio openly challenged 
Gartner’s assessment of SoftCo and Bob was forced to defend their position. 
Whilst Sergio stated that SoftCo was improving, it was clear to Bob that 
they were not sufficiently committed to the particular sector. As he saw it, 
they were being opportunistic in this market (‘they could be the global 
leader in [specific sector] if only they wanted to be’). This particular thread 
of conversation ended when Sergio was forced to fall into line with 
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Gartner’s assessment. Despite all his previous efforts, Sergio has to concede 
the territory to Gartner and accept their assessment.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Callon and colleagues (2002) suggest the economy can be understood in 
terms of the regimes of expertise, devices and practices that measure, 
classify, and draw boundaries around the properties of products and 
technologies. In this view ‘comparison’ is both central to the organization of 
the economy and the ranking of products like software, but also, at times, 
highly controversial. The suggestion in the work of Callon and others, and 
what I have attempted to build on here, is that to understand the ‘economy 
of qualities’ we must analyse how equivalences between vendors are made 
and resultant controversies dealt with – what I have described as the labour 
of comparison. This chapter has focused on the Magic Quadrant (MQ) 
which is a contested but highly influential object, my aim being to 
understand both the appeal and controversy it has generated. I have done 
this through treating the MQ not according to a representational idiom but a 
‘performative’ one, deploying recent ideas developed by Callon (2007) and 
MacKenzie (2003) where they suggest that theories and models play a 
crucial role in the doing of the economy. Adapting this argument to the case 
of industry analysts, I asked: to what extent is the advice of industry 
analysts ‘performative’?  
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Callon (2007) has described economic and financial theories as putting in 
motion a socio-technical agencement. Theories are successful (i.e., 
performative), he argues, when they create their corresponding socio-
technical agencement (the ‘context’ or ‘world’ they point to). The chapter 
analyzed the MQ describing four particular moments. Firstly, in enacting 
this world, the industry analysts potentially reshaped how people made 
decisions whilst choosing between vendors. The device offered an 
alternative comparative machinery through putting previously 
incommensurable technologies on a scale. It defined the two dimensions of 
this scale and created the possibility of ordinal assessment and ranking of 
vendors. Secondly, I have described the actualization of this world through 
the construction of a research process whereby industry analysts could 
speak ‘authoritatively’ about the competence and performance of software 
vendors. The analysts have established an extensive ‘calculative network’ 
through which they could draw on the views and opinions of those 
implementing and using the technologies of the vendors under scrutiny. This 
knowledge has an unusual quality (being informal, contingent and 
potentially subjective). Through the activities of the analysts this 
‘community knowledge’ is no longer the highly situated form of knowledge 
it once was but can be turned into a form of more robust commodified 
knowledge that could ‘travel the world’.  
 
Thirdly, this particular socio-technical agencement has begun to constitute 
the marketplace in various ways. It has established a number of new realities 
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– or, to use the language from the start of the paper, it has become 
‘successful’. Actors increasingly act according to the tool. Vendors, for 
instance, increasingly describe themselves according to this new 
comparative machinery, as well as being characterized in these terms by 
many of their customers. ‘Ability to execute’ and ‘completeness of vision’ 
have come to be treated as unproblematic (as well as ‘researchable’ and 
‘assessable’) measures of vendor performance. Moreover, the device 
conditions the activities of not only of vendors but increasingly of users. I 
observed one IT manager attempt to provide evidence of a vendor’s 
improving performance (to ensure continued vendor investment in the 
technology he had adopted). Even though his intervention did not yield the 
outcome he intended, the episode demonstrates how the IT market is 
increasingly ‘framed’ and this actor ‘equipped’. This suggests people are 
increasingly able to see the effects of their actions in relation to these kinds 
of tools – and to act accordingly. 
 
Finally, and to return to the place where this chapter began, all of this builds 
towards the argument that these tools are not arbitrary but contain defensible 
forms of knowledge (as could be seen by Bob’s strong rebuttal of Sergio’s 
attempt to influence them). This is not to say that the tools are viewed 
uncritically. As I have shown, the tool inhabits an interesting ‘grey space’. 
They are critiqued (mostly in the practitioner press) because amongst other 
things analysts are not always independent of those they assess. In Callon’s 
terms, these criticisms might be seen as ‘competing’ socio-technical 
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agencements attempting to problematize the world set out by the MQ. 
Imposing new worlds, argues Callon, always causes alternative ones to 
‘strike back’.  
 
In summary, these kinds of devices generate comparisons that do not exist 
elsewhere: they bring actors together in the same space through producing 
and standardizing relationships between them. In this respect, the MQ might 
therefore be described as a technology of comparison. Moreover, in writing 
this chapter I hope to give impetus to social scientists in understanding how 
highly simple devices like these have virtues in ‘qualifying’ and 
‘performing’ marketplaces. The labour of comparison is not a narrow, 
academic affair; there has been an enormous growth in dedicated experts 
and professionals, organizations and bodies, and various socio-technical 
devices all of which observe, analyse, and produce equivalences in some 
form (Barry and Slater, 2005). Industry analysts are one such body of 
experts who are not simply describing markets, they are not solely reporting 
on the qualities of vendors, they are creating those comparisons. 
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NOTES 
 
1 It is widely acknowledged that organizations today find it difficult to critically assess and 
evaluate large information technology (IT) solutions prior to purchase (Pollock and 
Williams, 2007, 2009). The difficulties adopters face is that they are assessing not just 
technical properties but also intangible issues regarding the future performance of a 
technology vendor (will it survive?), its behaviour (will it continue to invest in the 
particular market in coming years?), and particularly, the differences between 
technologies (Callon et al., 2002). At the same time, however, the institutional 
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frameworks for promoting and assessing complex IT solutions are becoming better 
established as can be seen by analysing the changes in the processes of assessment of 
technologies in the course of procurement. In the 1980s, for instance, consultancy 
organizations were beginning to collate information about supplier offerings and the new 
kinds of IT available, followed in the 1990s by the growth in popularity of specialist 
industry analysts and IT research firms (the Gartner Group, Forrester Research, the Meta 
Group, the Giga Group, International Data Corporation and so on) which gathered 
information on competing vendors in the IT marketplace (Firth and Swanson, 2005). 
Founded by Gideon Gartner in 1979, the Gartner Group has its headquarters in Stamford, 
Connecticut and offices in over 80 places around the world. It has 4,300 associates of 
which 1,400 are described as ‘expert analysts’ and ‘consultants’. 
2 The term (derived from the work of Deleuze and Guattari) is used to depict a 
heterogeneous collection of material and textual elements that act on and modify each 
other. As Callon notes there is nothing ‘outside’ a socio-technical agencement – theories 
or descriptions of the agencement, for instance, are not ‘external’ but part of the 
configuration, acting and bringing it into being. Callon argues that a theory is successful 
(performative) when it can create its corresponding socio-technical agencement. One 
other important aspect is the assertion that no one element (human or nonhuman) is 
assumed a priori to be more important than any other; they all, methodologically at least, 
have equal status, and in this sense they all can act. It is because of the implied symmetry 
here that Callon can argue that theories also set worlds in motion.  
3 For instance, in the earlier decision-making frame, vendors were assessed on measures 
that were effective in detailing how a potential system related to the needs and shape of a 
specific user (i.e., they were ‘accurate’) but provided little purchase on how vendors 
compared in catering for such requirements (i.e., they were not ordinal measures). 
Theodore Porter has argued that there are strong incentives in both the sciences and the 
economy for precise and standardizable measures rather than highly ‘accurate’ ones. He 
writes ‘[f]or most purposes, accuracy is meaningless if the same operations and 
measurements cannot be performed at other sites’ (1995, p. 29).  
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4 This resonates with Ian Hacking’s (1999) observation of how new classification schemes 
rarely simply stabilize settings but encourage newly sorted actors to act in different ways 
(often either conforming to, or rebelling from, the newly introduced classification).  
5 For MacKenzie (2009), an ‘equipment’ is the physical or cognitive things (like theories, 
models, technology and so on) that give actors within markets new abilities but also, 
importantly, modifies the nature and activity of these actors. 
